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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's appellate decision which 
vacated Clarence Tams' conviction for placing debris on a highway and 
dismissed the case. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinqs 
Tams was charged by Uniform Citation with a violation of I.C. 3 18-3906, 
which prohibits the placing of debris on highways, for "LITTERING[:] COW 
FECES ON HWY [sic]" (R., p.5), after the tractor trailer full of live cattle he was 
driving drained approximately 35 gallons of "brown liquid substance, a mixture of 
cattle urine, manure and rainwater," onto Highway 95 in Boundary County. (R., 
p.44.) Tams filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that I.C. § 18-3906 did not apply 
to his conduct as alleged in the citation. (R., pp.16-17.) The magistrate denied 
the motion to dismiss, finding that "animal feces would constitute any waste or 
other waste substance" under I.C. § 18-3906, and the case proceeded to a court 
trial. (R., pp.24-25, 27-31; 9/11/07 Tr., p.19, L . l  - p.20, L.1.) 
At the close of the evidence at the court trial, the magistrate found Tams 
guilty of violating I.C. §18-3906. (R., p.31; 10/17/07 Tr., p.95, Ls.2-6.) The 
magistrate entered judgment and imposed sentence. (R., p.32.) Tams timely 
appealed to the district court (R., p.33), and obtained an order staying his 
sentence pending the appeal (R., p.34). 
The district court set aside Tams' conviction and dismissed the case 
against him. (R., pp.44-59; Attached as Appendix A,) Specifically, the district 
court found that the magistrate committed error when it denied the motion to 
dismiss because, according to the district court, I.C. § 18-3906 does not apply to 
cattle urine and feces. (R., pp.49-51.) Further, the district court found the 
magistrate's finding that the state proved the requisite level of intent -that Tams 
willfully or negligently placed the waste on the highway - to be unsupported by 
substantial evidence. (R., pp.52-56.) This timely appeal followed. (R., pp.60- 
67.) 
ISSUES 
1. The plain language of I.C. § 18-3906 prohibits the placing of "any debris, 
paper, litter, ... trash or garbage, ... or other waste substance" upon a 
highway. Did the district court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that 
urine and feces does not qualify as "other waste substance" under I.C. § 
$8-3906? 
2. The magistrate, sitting as the trier of fact at the court trial, found the state 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Tams acted negligently. This 
finding is supported by substantial evidence. Did the district court commit 
reversible error when it substituted its view of the facts for those of the 
trier of fact? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Concludinq That I.C. 5 19-3906 
Does Not Prohibit The Dum~ina Of Urine And Feces On A Hiahway 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate read the plain language of I.C. § 18-3906 and determined 
the prohibitions of the statute, particularly the phrase "other waste substance," 
encompassed urine and feces. (9/11/07 Tr., p.19.) The district court reversed, 
finding "cattle urine and feces" did not qualify as "debris," "litter" or "substance," 
specifically finding that the statute did not prohibit the dumping of any liquid. (R., 
pp.49-51.) The district court's decision is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute and rules of statutory interpretation 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision," State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." j&. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." Id. (citing Losser, 145 
ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 ldaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
Constitutional and statutory construction issues involve questions of law 
over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Casey, 125 ldaho 
C. ldaho Code 5 18-3906 
The state charged Tams with violating I.C. 5 18-3906 which provides, in 
relevant part: 
Placing debris on highways. (1) If any person shall wilfully or 
negligently throw from any vehicle, place, deposit or permit to be 
deposited upon or alongside of any highway, street, alley or 
easement used by the public for public travel, any debris, paper, 
litter, glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, 
boards, trash or garbage, lighted material, or other waste 
substance, such persons shall, upon conviction thereof, be 
punished . .. . 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
D. Ap~lication Of Established Principles Of Statutorv Construction Shows 
That I.C. (i 18-3906 Prohibits The Placement Of Urine And Feces On A 
Hiahway 
The standards applicable to the construction of criminal statutes are weil- 
established: 
The object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to 
lebislative intent. The literal words of the statute provide the best 
guide to legislative intent, and therefore, the interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. The plain 
meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd 
results. This Court gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning. Moreover, this Court must consider all 
sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent of 
the legislature. If the language of a statute is capable of more than 
one reasonable construction it is ambiguous. When a statute is 
ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the legislature 
intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only 
the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of 
proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history. 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, - , 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
After consulting Webster's Dictionary for the definitions of "debris," "litter," 
and "substance," the district court concluded the statute prohibited the dumping 
only of 
a solid, something that remains on the road if thrown out by a driver 
(or permitted to be deposited by the driver), and which can be 
picked up. This Court finds "waste substance" as used in ldaho 
Code 5 18-3906 does not include a liquid which, if spilled, is 
essentially impossible to pick up. 
(R., p.50.) The district court reinforced its conclusion by recourse to the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis, finding "ldaho Code 3 18-3906 only prohibits solids, not 
liquids." (R., p.51.) The district court's conclusion is contrary to the plain 
language of the statute and to the rules of statutory construction. 
1) The District Court's Conclusion Is Contraw To The Plain Lansuaqe 
Of The Statute 
Tams dumped a liquid mixture of urine and feces on the highway. I.C. 5 
18-3906 prohibits the placing on a highway of "any debris, paper, litter, ... trash 
or garbage, ... or other waste substance." While the district court consulted 
Webster's Dictionary to ascertain the definitions of the words "debris," "litter" and 
"substance," presumably to give these words their "plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning" pursuant to the rules of statutory interpretation, it did not likewise 
obtain the definition of the word "waste." 
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 2001, includes 
within its definition of "waste": 
4b: refuse from places of human or animal habitation: as (1): 
GARBAGE, RUBBISH (2): EXCREMENT ... (3) SEWAGE. 
(Capitalization and punctuation in original.) Applying the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the word employed by the legislature, "waste" encompasses urine 
and feces 
2) The District Court's Conclusion Is Contrary To Rules Of Statutory 
Interpretation 
In response to Tams' argument that application of the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis required the court to find that the statute only applied to "items that 
would hurt vehicles on the road," the district court instead concluded that "the 
stronger application of the doctrine" compels a finding that the statute "only 
prohibits solids and not liquids. The district court misapplied this doctrine, and 
impermissibly narrowed the application of the statute. 
In order for the doctrine of ejusdem generis to apply, there must be an 
enumeration or list of specific items followed by general words. People v. 
Headrick, 64 ldaho 132, 128 P.2d 575 (1942): 
One of the maxims of statutory construction is the rule which holds 
that "where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of 
persons or things, such general words will be construed as 
meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to 
those specifically enumerated, usually designated the ejusdem 
generis rule." Pepple v. Headrick, 64 ldaho 132, 128 P.2d 575 
(1 942). 
State v. Hart, 135 ldaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850, 854 (2001). 
The district court erroneously treated the list enumerated in the statute as 
one of specific items followed by the catch-all phrase "waste substance." In fact, 
the statute is a mix of specific and general terms: 
any debris, paper, litter, glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, hoops, 
cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, lighted material, or 
other waste substance.. . 
I.C. Ej 18-3906(1). "Debris," "litter," "trash or garbage," "lighted material" and 
"other waste substance" are all general terms that may themselves encompass 
the specifically enumerated items. The specifically enumerated items, as a 
group, may in turn be classified several different ways, whether as substances 
that would cause damage to a motor vehicle; substances that create a safety 
hazard if deposited on the highway; or, as found by the district court, "solids" or 
"things you can pick up." The statute's construction resists the strict application 
of the doctrine. 
Further, the district court's application of the doctrine acted to improperly 
narrow the application of the statute. "Ejusdem generis is merely a rule of 
statutory construction and does not justify a court in 'confining the operation of a 
statute within narrower limits than intended by the legislature."' 135 ldaho 
at 832, 25 P.3d at 855, citing Willard v. First Security Bank of ldaho, 69 ldaho 
265, 268, 206 P.2d 770, 773 (1949). The statute's mix of general and specific 
terms reflects, as the magistrate found, the legislature's efforts to describe 
"everything specifically the legislature could think of and then a catchall of 
anything else that is a waste that's being thrown from a vehicle." (9/11/07 Tr., 
p.19, Ls.19-21.) Instead, the district court, employing its narrowed definition of 
"substance" and excluding any attempt at defining "waste," treated the list as 
exclusive, thereby impermissibly narrowing the application of the statute. 
Further, the district court's interpretation would lead to the absurd result 
that a person may be prosecuted for placing some quantity of feces on a 
highway, but avoid prosecution by the expedient of dumping the same quantity of 
feces on the highway, but mixed with some quantity of urine or water. Further, 
the district court's interpretation would apparently preclude prosecution of a 
person who dumps 35 gallons of any liquid on the highway - whether motor oil, 
pancake syrup, yogurt, or coffee. "A construction of a statute that would lead to 
an absurd result is disfavored." State v. Harrison, 147 Idaho 678, -, 214 P.3d 
664, - (Ct. App. 2009). 
The district court's interpretation of I.C. § 18-3906 ignores the plain 
meaning of the words used by the legislature, and is contrary to established rules 
of statutory construction. The plain meaning of the words "other waste 
substance," as used in I.C. 5 18-3906, encompasses feces and urine among 
those sub'stances that are prohibited from being placed on a highway. 
Therefore, the district cburt's appellate decision, which vacated Tam's conviction 
based upon an incorrect interpretation of the law, must be reversed. 
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Found The State Had Not 
Proved Tams Was Negligent 
A. Introduction 
The magistrate found the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Tams acted negligently when the trailer tractor he was driving dumped 
approximately 35 gallons of urine and feces on Highway 95. (10117/07 Tr., p.94, 
L.8 - p.95, L.94.) The district court disagreed, finding that the "uncontested 
testimony" of Tams and one of his co-workers that "an animal must have 
stepped on a drain" compelled the opposite finding. (R., p.52.) The district 
court's finding is error 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing the decision of the district court acting in its appellate 
capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision. Losser v. 
Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). Thus, this Court 
considers whether the district court committed error with respect to the issues 
presented. State v. Loomis, 146 ldaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009). 
C. Applicable Statutes 
The state charged Tams with violating I.C. § 18-3906 when several 
gallons of a liquid consisting of cattle urine and feces drained from the livestock 
truck he was driving on a highway. That statute provides, in relevant part: 
Placing debris on highways. (1) If any person shall wilfully or 
negligently throw from any vehicle, place, deposit or permit to be 
deposited upon or alongside of any highway, street, alley or 
easement used by the public for public travel, any debris, ... or 
other waste substance, such persons shall, upon conviction 
thereof, be punished ... . 
The state, therefore, had to prove that Tams acted "willfully or negligently" when 
the cattle urine and feces dumped from his truck onto the highway. These terms 
are defined in I.C. § 18-101: 
1. The word "wilfully," when applied to the intent with which an act 
is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to 
commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require 
any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any 
advantage. 
2. The words "neglect," "negligence," "negligent," and "negligently," 
import a want of such attention to the nature of probable 
consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily 
bestows in acting in his own concerns. 
I.C. 33 18-lOl(1) and (2). 
D. The District Court Erred When It Made Its Findinq That Tams Did Not Act 
Neqliqently 
The magistrate found the state had proved that Tams' acted negligently 
for his failure to ensure that the accumulating quantity of feces and urine, 
exacerbated by the steady rain, did not dump on the highway. (10117/07 Tr., 
p.94, L.8 - p.95, L.94.) The district court incorrectly ruled that this finding was 
not supported by substantial evidence 
The district court's finding that there was not substantial evidence to 
support a finding of negligence was premised on its understanding and 
application of testimony by Tams and his co-worker regarding the possible cause 
for the urine and feces being dumped on the highway. The district court focused 
on the testimony of Tams and his co-worker to the effect that "the cause of a spill 
from under the trailer would be an animal accidentally stepping on a floor drain," 
(R., p.57), particularly where "Tams simply has no control of where any one of 
these several animals places one of its four feet at any given moment" (R., p.53). 
The district court found that this testimony mandated against a finding of 
negligence. The district court's application of this testimony to the law is error. 
Negligence in this context "import[s] a want of such attention to the nature 
of probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily 
bestows in acting in his own concerns." I.C. 9 18-lOl(2). The district court 
apparently considered it not "a probable consequence" of Tams having failed to 
relieve the accumulation of urine, feces and rainwater in the tractor trailer and 
continuing to travel on the highway, would be that one of the many cattle placed 
in the tractor trailer might step on a floor drain and cause the accumulation of 
urine, water and feces to dump on the road, or that it might simply overflow and 
slosh onto the road. 
The magistrate, in contrast, specifically recognized the tension between 
the testimony by Tams and his co-worker of the difficulty of removing the 
accumulating waste from the truck so that it didn't spill out the sides or out of the 
drain in the event of a drain failure (caused by cattle), and the object of the 
statute: that waste and debris not be dumped on the roadway, causing a driving 
hazard. (10/17/07 Tr., p.94, Ls.17-25.) The magistrate correctly applied the 
definition of "negligent" to the circumstances of this case. 
The magistrate found that the driver had a duty to take action to avoid the 
natural consequence of an accumulation of rain, urine and feces mixed with the 
potential that an animal might cause a drain failure or the waste would slop out 
the side of the trailer. The district court's contrary finding is error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the magistrate's verdict finding Tams guilty of placing debris on a highway. 
DATED this 18'~ day of November, 2 
Deputy Attorney General 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Boundary )= 
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CLERK, DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
STATE OF I DANO, ) 
) Case NO. BF CR 2007-558 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. 
CLARENCE TAMS, 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) ORDER ON APPEAL 1 
) 
Defendant. 1 \ 
- - 
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
This is an appeal from the Magistrate Division from the October 17,2009, Order of 
Magistrate Judge Justin Julian denying defendant's motion to dismiss, and an appeal from 
the finding of guilt following court trial on October 17, 2007. Notice of Appeal, p .  1. 
On May 3, 2007, defendant Clarence Tams (Tams) was driving a tractor trailer full of 
cattle from a feedlot in Alberta, Canada, to a meat processing plant in the state of 
Washington. Tams was driving in Idaho and was stopped at the truck stop near the 
intersection of Highway 95 and U.S. Highway 2 in an area known as three-mile junction, 
about three miles North of Bonners Ferry, Idaho. Odober 17,2007, Trial Transcript, p. 3, 
LI. 3-22. 
From the truck stop, Tams made a low speed left turn onto U.S. Highway 95, when 
Officer Donald Moore (Moore) observed a large amount, about 3540 gallons, of brown 
liquid substance, a mixture of cattle urine, manure and rainwater, escape from the trailer 
..-..**...-....---. " -.. ...- -....-- -.. .---.. 
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onto the highway for about 3-4 seconds for about 15 yards. Id., p.. 4, L.. 15 - p. 5, L. 6; p. 
7, LI. 21-25; p.. 6, LI., 3-10. Moore is certain the spillage came from under the trailer and 
not out the side of the trailer. Id., p, 4, LI. 15-24; p. 12, LI.. 15-20. Moore followed Tams 
south on Highway 95 to Bonners Ferry, through Bonners Ferry and then stopped Tams 
with his overhead lights at the southern end of Bonners Ferry.. Id., p.. 6 ,  Ll., 74-16: p. 0, L. 
25 - p.. 26, L. I. As Tams pulled his tractor trailer to the side of the road, a small amount of 
brown liquid substance escaped from the trailer onto the highway. Id,, p. 9, I., 19 - p. 15, L.. 
14.. This small amount of liquid was located to the side of Tams' trailer on the un-travelled 
portion of the highway. Id . ,  State's Exhibits 1-6. In between the first and second spill, 
Moore appareniiy observed no other liquid being discharged.. Moore did not examine the 
small amount of liquid on the highway at the stap. Id., p. 8, LI. 24-25. Moore did not go 
back and examine the big spill he first observed. Id., p. 22, LI. 21-25. On his way back to 
Canada the next day, Tams specifically looked at the site ofthe big spill and "didn't see 
anything." Id., p. 83, LI. 4-25. Tams attributed that to the fact that most of the liquid was 
water.. Id.., p. 84, LI.. 1-2. Moore opined, based on smell, the liquid was caftle urine and 
feces.. Id., p. 8, L. 22-25. Moore did not observe anyone adjust the drains in the trailer the 
entire time he followed it. Id., p. 18, L. 2 - p. 19, L. 3. 
At that stop on May 3, 2007, Moore cited Tams for "Littering", for "placing debris 
upon a public highway", a violation of Idaho Code 5 18-3906. Id., p.. 8. LI. 18-22; citation. 
The debris was the cattle urine and feces. Id., p. 8, LI. 22-23. 
It is undisputed that once the cattle are loaded in Canada, the load is sealed by a 
veternarian, and Tams is not allowed to break the seal. Id., p. 34, L. 16 - p. 36, L. 25. The 
seal is put on by the Canadian government and is required by United States federal law. 
Id. Only a veterinarian may break the seal. Id. Tams must essentially drive the load of 
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cattle non-stop to the slaughterhouse in the Tri-Cities. In his briefing, Tams claims: "The 
floor drains cannot be opened while the trailer is loaded with the cattle do [due] to risk of an 
animal putting a leg down the drain resulting in injury to the animal." Appeal Brief, p. 4. 
Tams takes issue with Judge Hardin's finding that: "Using a cane to move those cattle 
aside and open that drain because if a mixture of urine, feces, and water comes out of that 
vehicle onto the roadway is going to significantly increase any stopping distances.. .", is not 
supported by the record Id., pp. 12-13. Judge Hardin did make such a finding. October 
I 
17, 2007, Trial Transcript, p. 94, LI. 20-25. Such a finding is supported, as Tams testified 
that he could have opened the floor drains. id., p 79, LI. 20-22. However, Tams also 
testified as to how he could do this. Tams testified it is not at all safe, and it would involve 
coming down from the top of the trailer through two levels of trailer packed with animals 
Id., p. 72, L. 18 - p., 73, L.. 11. It is not safe because you are essentially placing yourself in 
a confined area with a bunch of animals ld. Tams has only done this on one occasion in 
his career, and that was with the help of someone else. Id. What is beyond dispute is that 
Tams did nothing at any time to adjust the floor drains. Id., p. 79, LI. 16-19 
On Jdy 10, 2007, Tams filed a Motion to Dismiss. That matter was briefed and 
affidavits were filed. At the conclusion of the September 11,2007, oral argument, Judge 
Justin Julian denied Tams' Motion to Dismiss, 
A court trial was held on October 17, 2007, before Judge Quentin Wardin At the 
end of the State's case, Tams moved for a judgment of acquittal. Id., p. 25, LI. 16-23. 
Judge Hardin denied that motion to dismiss, stating that I.C. 9 18-3906 and I.C. § 18-101 
do not require criminal negligence in the sense that his behavior must be reckless or 
heedless or wanton"; "all it requires is the willfulness which may be an indifference to the 
safety or rights of others." ld., p. 26, Ll. 15-19. 
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At the conclusion of that court trial, Judge Mardin found Tams guilty of "Littering" and 
imposed fine and costs in the amount of $100.00, and imposed two days on the Sheriffs 
Labor Program or four actual days in jail Tams elected the Sheriff's Labor Program, but 
posted an appeal bond and Judge Hardin stayed execution of the sentence pending this 
appeal. 
The next day, October 18,2007, Tams filed his Notice of Appeal The appeal was 
assigned to District Judge Steve Verby. On May 2,2008, Tams filed his Appeal Brief On 
May 30, 2008, the State filed Respondent's Appeal Brief. On August 6,2008, Tams filed 
Appellant's Rebuttal Brief. At that point, nothing further happened and no oral argument 
was scheduled 
The next event evidenced in the ffle was the January 9, 2009, Order of 
Reassignment, assigning the undersigned District Judge for purposes of the appeal On 
March 10, 2009, this Court scheduled oral argument for April 27,2009. Later in the day on 
March 'lo, 2009, the parties stipulated to waive oral argument and have the matter 
submitted on the briefs. On April 77, 2009, this Court ordered the oral argument waived 
and the matter submitted on the briefs. Accordingly, the matter is now at issue. 
In Tams' Notice of Aoppeal, he raises six issues: 1) Judge Julian erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss by finding ldaho Code 5 18-3906 applies to animal waste falling upon 
a public highway; 2) the Court [unspecified which court] erred in failing to find ldaho Code 
3 18-3906 violates the Interstate Commerce Clause; 3) Judge Julian erred in finding 
without any evidence in the record that iocal government had a superseding interest in 
requiring livestock haulers engaged in interstatefinternational commerce to modify 
equipment; 4) Judge Hardin's finding at trial that Tams intentionally or carelessly permitted 
animal waste to be discharged upon the public right of way is not supported by the record; 
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5) Judge Mardin erred in finding that Tams had the option available to him and the duty to 
leave the right of way onto private property where the drains could be opened and the 
waste discharged onto private property off the public right of way; and 6) Judge Hardin 
erred in failing to require the prosecution to prove each eiement of the crime, including 
criminal intent or criminal negligence beyond a reasonable doubt Appeal Brief, pp 4-5 in 
Appellant's Rebuttal Brief, Tams argues for the first time that there is no evidence that the 
ldaho Transportation Department posted notices of this littering statute, ldaho Code 5 18- 
3906(1), as required by that statute. Appellant's Rebuttal Brief, p. 1 While this issue was 
never mentioned in the record, and thus the State failed to prove an element of this 
offense, this issue was raised for the first time in Tams' Rebuttal Brief. Failure of an 
appellant to raise an issue in the appellant's initial brief, precludes review by the appellate 
court., Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co , 135 ldaho 446,452,19 P 3d 760,766 (2001) 
I!. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The swpe of appellate review on an appeal to the district court from the 
magistrate's division shall be the same as review from the district court to the Supreme 
Court. 1.R.C.P 83(u). in an action originally heard in a magistrate's court, the district court 
should adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P 2d 532 (1978) Findings of fact will not be disturbed if they 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co., 135 
ldaho 446, 448, 19 P.3d 760,762 (2001). This Court will freely review whether the 
magistrate court's conclusions of law correctly stated the legal rules or principles and 
correctly applied those rules to the facts found. Id. This Court is free to draw its own legal 
conclusions from the facts presented. Id. 
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111. ANALYSIS. 
A. Applicable Statutes. 
Idaho Code 5 18-3906 reads: 
Placing debris on highways. - (1) If any person shall willfully or 
negligently throw from any vehicle, place, deposit or permit to be 
deposited upon or alongside of any highway, street, alley or easement 
used by the public for public travel, any debris, paper, litler, glass bottle, 
glass, nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, 
lighted material, or other waste substance, such persons shall, upon 
conviction thereof, be phished by a fine not exceeding three hundred 
dollars ($300) or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding ten (10) 
days. * * * The ldaho transportation department is directed to post along 
state highways at convenient and appropriate places, notices of the 
context of said law.. 
Idaho Code 5 18-7031, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person to deposit debris on 
public or private property, uses the same litany ("....any debris, paper, litter, glass bottles, 
glass, nails, tacks, hooks, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash, garbage, lighted material or 
other waste substances.. ."). ldaho Code 5 18-101(1) reads: 
The word "willfully" when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit: the act or make 
the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to 
injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 
See State v. Poe, 139 ldaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2004). ldaho Code 3 18-10112) reads: 
The words "neglect," "negligence," "negligent," and "negligently," import a 
want of such attention to the nature of probable consequences of the act 
or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his awn 
concerns. 
. . . ,  . .  
. '>, .. 
B. &~ixtuf$:$f .,.. '.I *;.: *, :,, ., . . . ~a@e,u"&$, ~ee'es anj3 Ra~n is. 
. ,  , >  
This Court has not been cited to any statutory definition of "debris". This Court has 
not found a statutory definition of the word "debris" on its own.. According to Webster's 
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (1983)' p. 329, debris is defined as: "to break into pieces", 
'the remains of something broken down or destroyed", or "an accumulation of fragments of 
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rock," @!j8:*a ip:.n*. ~mi~@re~i~af: ' :&@&,:~~l;~andfec~-does . ,  .., . . .  , . . . .  not omport . with , , , any .. ..of . ... these . . ~ , . .  . definitions . . ..,.. . of :!2;v<t 
. ,,. .,,. :,!'R*G:4z:.:' $,~~&rls:,s.i-rEii 
,:, "x~,4>3,j,,\,!&,*..e... ,-. 
It is understandable how Judge Hardin could conclude that a mixture of cattle urine 
- 
and feces could be a "waste substance" as enumerated in I.C. 5 18-3906. But if that were 
the case, it would be the only liquid in that statutory list o t  "debris, paper, litter, glass 
! 
bottle, glass, nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, lighted 
material, or other waste substance". While Moore cited lams for "Littering", that word is 
not found in I.C.. 5 18-3906. That same dictionary defines "litter" as; ''trash, wastepaper, or 
i 
garbage scattered about (trying to clean up the roadside)".. Webstet's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary, (? 983), p.. 698. No liquids are mentioned in that definition of litter. That same 
dictionary defines "Substance" in several ways, but the most applicable is. "physical 
I 
material from which something is made or which has discrete existence".. Webstets Ninth 
! 
I 
New Collegiate Dictionary, (1983), p. 1176. This Court finds "waste substance" as used in 
Idaho Code 5 $8-3906, given the definition of 'debris", the definition of the word "litteringn 
(since Moore used both of those words), and the definition of the word "substance", 
prohibits a solid, something that remains on the road if thrown orlt by a driver (or permitted 
can be picked up 
. . 
90'6 does not in 
Tams' argument is that Idaho Code $ 183906 and its list of prohibited items from 
being thrown, placed or deposited from a vehicle: "debris, paper, litter, glass bottle, glass, 
nails, tacks, hoops, cans, barbed wire, boards, trash or garbage, lighted material, or other 
waste substance", contemplate combustible items (debris, paper and litter, boards, trash or 
garbage, lighted material), or items that would hurt vehicles on the road (glass, nails tacks, 
! 
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hoops, cans, barbed wires). Appeal Brief, pp. 5-7 Tams argues the rule of ejusdem 
generis, that "general and specific words in a statute which are associated together, and 
which are capable of an analogous meaning take color from each other, so that the general 
words are restricted to a sense analogous to the less general " Id., p. 6, citing 73 AmJur2d 
I 
407 The doctrine of ejosdem generis has been adopted in ldaho In Sfate v. Kavajecz, 
139 ldaho 482,486,80 P.3d 1083,1087 (2003) the ldaho Supreme Court stated: 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, a rule of statutory construction that finds 
"where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or 
things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or 
things of like or similar class or character to those specifically 
enumerated," is pertinent in this case. Sfafe v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 
25 P 3d 850,854 (2002). 
While there is merit in Tams' argument that ldaho Code $ 18-3906 would prohibit only 
combustibles or sharp items that would harm tires 
I 
,,. . 
o enumerated descriptors in ldaho Code 3 f9-3906 that might apply 
1 in this case are "debris" (used specifically by Moore in issuing the citation) and "waste I ...,,,.....,..., 
substance" (used by Judge Hardin at trial). Up$ei thedoctrine of YejuSdemge 
substance" (as described by Judge Hardin at the conclusion of Tams' trial). Id,, p. 95, L. 6. 
This statutory construcZion is an issue of law over which this Court has free review. 
Rhead v. Hartford Ins. Co., supra, 135 ldaho 446,448, 19 P.3d 760, 762.. On this point, 
the decision of Judge Hardin (Id., p. 96, L. 6) and Judge Julian are reversed.. '~e~ternber  
I I, 2007, Transcript, p. 79, L. I - p. 20, L. I ..,, &.-. X5~is:Court specifically finds thata mixture of y,: CJ., 
catlle,.urine, ..!.> feces andrain; is not"debrisn or a "waste substance" as set forthin Idaho 
,... . 
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Um, it seems to me ihat he was negligent. That - absent negligence 
given the Officers testimony this doesn't happen with other vehicles he is 
seeina out there that are iust like this vehicle. This doesn't happen.. How 
else can he explain it. S; there are many times in the law where 
negligence can be proven by facts and circumstances. You don't have to 
have an expert witness, you don't have to go all over the truck. It's just 
because when common sense, you look at it and the situation and what 
others in the same or similar situation have encountered and this deviates 
substantially from that then somebody has done something wrong and 
that's what has happened here and that's why 1 submit that he's guilty.. 
id., p.. 93, L. 12 -p.. 94, L. 7. That argument ignores the testimony of Moore that the liquid 
did not slosh out the side of the trailer, and it igH6~~2he.:oncontr&dicted tesfimonyof 
~~p.Goodfellow:and.:iams . .. .that..an.,anim~l..must. have.st,epped..on a drain.. ,That argument also 
ignores the fact that apparently there were at least two other similar "conceptually related 
cases" the State was prosecuting. September 11,2007, Hearing on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, Tr. p. 1, LI. 3-15.. In any event, Judge Hardin found: 
I have reviewed Idaho Code 18-3906 and I've also listened to the 
testimony that the truck is sealed. But frankly if it's raining that hard, so 
it's filling that truck so it's going to slosh out uh 1 think there may be an 
obligation to find some farm pasture, some shipping point, some place 
where caftle are loaded. Using a cane to move those cattle aside and 
open that drain because if a mixture of urine, feces, and water comes out 
of that vehicle onto the roadway is going to significantly increase any 
stopping distances. If it sloshes out of that truck on a corner and 
somebody on a two wheel conveyance comes around that comer even at 
a lawful speed they are going to go down. Uh I have to say I am 
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that in the context of 18-3906 you 
are guilty of littering. A person who shall willfully or negligently permit to 
be deposited upon or alongside any highway used by the public for public 
travel a waste substance. * * * But exhibits 3 and 4 show that material 
obviously came out of the sides of that vehicle. If it did it while stopping 
it'll do it while it's going threw corners and that can constitute a significant 
hazard to other members of the motoring public and 1 would find that does 
constitute the willful indifference to the safety or tights of other members 
of the motoring public. 
Id., p. 94, L. '17 - p. 95, L. 16. Thisaignores the testimony of Moore. Moore testified he 
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saw nothing that caused the trailer to spill. Id., p.. 16, LI. 9-1 0. Moore testified Tams drove 
cautiously, only travelling 25 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone. Id., p. 19, L. 18 - 
p. 20, L. 8; p. 21, LI. 6-20.. Moore also testified: 
Q. Now when you came up to the intersection did you notice anything? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What? 
A. I observed a cattle truck with Alberta license plate, making a left hand 
turn off of Highway 2 onto southbound Highway 95. As the truck was 
makina its turn I observed a large amount of liquid coming from the 
underneath of the trailer by theiear wheels. 
Q. Was - did any of this liquid appear to be coming from the sides of the 
truck. 
A,. No sir. 
Id., p. 4, LI. 15-24. While at the time he stopped Tams, Moore seems to say the liquid 
came out of the side of the vehicle(ld., p. Z 1, LI. f 1-24), Moore again clarified that the big 
spill did not come from the side of the vehicle. Id., p.. 12, Li. 15-20, 
The only evidence is that for this amount of liquid to come out of the trailer, one of 
the cattle must have stepped on a floor drain. Testimony of Brian Goodfellow, October 17, 
2007, Trial Transcript, p.31, U.. 10-19; p.. 33 LI. 7-20; p. 38, LI. 6-19; p .  50, LI.. 10-21. 
Goodfellow testified: 
...p robably because an animal stepped on the floor just right close to We 
corner of something and with the flexing of the floor. This is a little bit 
more rigid and it's not a fool proof method. 
Id., p. 52, LI. 2-7. Tams testified the same, that the discharge was consistent with an 
animal stepping on the drain. Id., p. 84, L.. 1 - p. 85, L. 3. That being the case, how fast or 
slow Tams was driving is irrelevant. Tams simply has no control of where any one of these 
several animals places one of its four Feet at any given moment. 
Tams testified: 
a. Just a - two final questions. Is there anything that you intentionatly did 
or failed to do that - that you know of that cause the uh slippage or - or 
uh discharge manure from your trailer? 
. . . - - - . . '53 
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A. There is nothing I can do other than have absolutely no hole, crack tha 
it would have to be sealed. 
Q. And is that something that is available in the industry at this point in 
time? 
A. They don't make them like that., You need to -you have to have a 
clean orrt. 
.... , 
id,., p. 86, LI.. 5-1 3. 
Judge Hardin stated the actions of Tams "does not require criminal negligence in the 
I 
sense that his behavior must be reckless or heedless or wanton", "all it requires is the 
willfulness which may be an indifference to the safety or tights of others." Id, p. 26. LI. 15- 
19 That is not necessarily wrong, but the language used by Judge Hardin does not track 
the statutes. As mentioned above, ldaho Code 5 18-lOl(1) reads: 
The word "wilifully" when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make 
the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to 
injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 
See Stafe v. Pae, 139 ldaho 885, 905, 88 P 3d 704,724 (2004). ldaho Code § 18-101(2) 
reads: 
The words "neglect," "negligence," "negligent," and "negligently," import a 
want of such attention to the nature of probable consequences of the act 
or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own 
concerns.. 
Concerning "willfulness", the State put on no proof that Tams "intended" to spill any amount 
of liquid as'he left the weigh station. No "purpose or willingness to commit the act 
(spilling)" was proven. Condeniing "negligence", the State put on no evidence that there 
was a "want of such attention to the nature of probable consequences of the act or 
omission (spilling) as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns." Had 
. . . *.:,:,7 
the Stateiput on' proof that Tams had spilled just before Moore witnessedthe spillcoming~ 
out of the gas station, or had the State put on evidence that Tams spilled through the town A 
of Bonners Ferry and kept on driving, there would be evidence of a %ant of such attention 
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to the nature of probable consequences of the act or omission (spilling) as a prudent man 
ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns." 
On crossexamination, Tams admitted that if you want to take a corner a certain 
-~ 
way, a driver can get liquid to come squirting out the sides. Id., p. 88, L.. 18 - p,. 89, L. 1 .. 
However, there is absolutely no evidence that Tams did this.. In fact, the only evidence is 
that Moore observed the large discharge come from under the trailer and not the sides.. 
, . 
Judge Hardin was mistaken in this factual finding.. The o Tams .. . . . drove . .. .. :,~, . ,:
$!:*,-. . . . . . . . . 
cauti~u'~Iy,below the speed limit, didn't swerve, and that Moore saw no reason whysuch .>,.,> a 
large amount of liquid came out of the trailer. 
c 
In order for his actions or omissions to be willful under Idaho Code § 18-101(1), 
Tams has to infend to do something (or infend to fail to do something) to cause this 
leakage. There is no evidence to support a finding that the large amount of liquid came out 
of Tarns' trailer due to high speed cornering or some other maneuver for which Tams 
created. The only evidence is this fluid came from under the trailer The only evidence as 
to the source of such fluid from under the trailer is an animal stepping on a drain trap. 
Tams is not iiable for an animal stepping on a drain trap 
for his actions or omissions to be negligent und 
Tams acts or omissions had to lack "such attention to the natu 
consequences of the act or omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his , 
i 
own concerns," Since the undisputed evidence is this spill came out from underneath 
Tams' trailer, and not the sides, and the undisputed evidence as to the source of stich flhd 
emanating from under was an animal stepping on a drain trap, Tams is not guilty of lacking 
"such attention to the nature of probable consequences of the act or omission as a prudent 
man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns". 
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Judge Julian was correct in not deciding this issue on a motion to dismiss.. At the 
time of the motion to dismiss, limited information was presented to Judge Julian, but there 
were disputes of facts on issues such as how much liquid came out from under the trailer, 
and there were credibility decisions to be made. September 11, 2007, Transcript, p. 18, Ll. 
1-25. Judge Julian stated: 
... and I don't know as we sit here now, what the State is going to be able 
to prove, if they can prove up willfulness, that is that somebody 
intentionally pulled a lever and drained manure onto the roadway, or 
whether it's going to be proof of negligence. But in either event it is clear 
that the defense is correct that it is the State's burden to prove willful or 
negligent, as defined by the criminal law, beyond a reasonable doubt So, 
again, uh, those issues await trial. That's what we have trials for and 
that's, uh, that's where were going to address those issues. 
id., LI. 18-25, However, at the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Hardin concluded that 
Tams was negligent, and thus, guilty of violating Idaho Code 3 18-3906. Id., p. 94, L.. 17 - 
p, 95, L. 16. That finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Moore felt that he cited Tams for both the large spill at the inception of Moore's 
observation of Tams, and the minor spilling off the travelled portion of the highway at the 
point he pulled Tams off the road.. Id., p.. 15, L1.6-12.. However, a review of State's 
Exhibits 1-6, show this to be the sort of de minimus spill that Judge Hardin specifically 
stated he would not find to be a violation of ldaho Code Cj $8-3906: 
A de minimus amount of material from a drain, I'd throw the case out in a 
heartbeat. The amount depicted in State's exhibit 1, State's exhibit 2 ,  
State's exhibit 6, State's exhibit 5 those are de mionimis amounts of 
material that do not merit any kind of sanction because hauling lievestock 
is a legitimate function. But exhibits 3 and 4 show that material obviously 
came out the sides of that vehicle. If it did it while stopping it'll do it while 
ifs going threw comers. .. 
Id., p. 95, LI. 8-13, Judge nardin did not specifically quantify the amount of liquid on the 
ground in State's Exhibits 3 and 4. While those two photos show mare than the truly de 
minitnos amounts depicted in Exhibits 1, 2, and 6, they do not show a large volume of 
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liquid which was once on the ground, and they show no solids. Judge Hardin used Exhibits 
3 and 4 to essentially contradict Moore, who was steadfast in his testimony that the liquid 
he saw initially come out of Tams trailer did not wme out of the sides ofthe trailer. Thus, 
what Judge Hardin obsewed next to the truck at scene of the stop as depicted in Exhibits 3 
and 4 cannot change the only testimony by the only person who observed the initial spill at 
three-mile junction, ORicer Moore. Maore's testimony is that the large spill came from 
under the trailer and not out the side of the trailer. The only evidence as to the cause of a 
I 
I 
spill from under the trailer would be an animal accidentally stepping on a floor drain. That 
I . being the undisputed facts of this case, Tams is not "negligent", nor is his conduct "willful.." 
D. Interstate Commerce Clause. 
In Appellant's Rebuttal Brief, Tams for the first time argues: 
A review of the Court Clerk's records in Boundary County will reveal that 
citations for violations of 1.C. 18-3906 are almost exclusively Canadian 
licensed operators driving Canadian licensed cattle trucks. Such is a clear 
showing that Boundary County is applying a different standard in applying 
I.C. 18-3906 to Canadian livestock haulers en route to Washington meat 
packing plants than to local industry such as timber and agriculture. This 
is an indication that Boundary County and the City of Bonners Ferry is 
violating the commerce clause applying the equal treatment rule that 
Respondent raises. 
Appellant's Rebuttal Brief, p. 6. This is an odd argument for Tams to make, as in his initial 
brief he stated: "Defendants do not contend the ldaho Law give preferential treatment to 
local trucks ...." Appeal Brief, p. 8. While this issue was raised by the Sfate (Respondent's 
Appeal Brief, p. 17), thus, avoiding preclusion of review of that issue on appeal under 
I Rhead v. Harfford Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 448,452, 19 P.3d 760,766 (2001), that issue was 
never raised before either magistrate. Most importantly, there is nothing in the record to 
support Tams' claim that "A review of the Court Clerk's records in Boundary County will 
reveal that citations for violations of I.C. 18-3906 are almost exclusively Canadian licensed 
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operators driving Canadian licensed cattle trucks." Accordingly, this Court will not address 
this issue. 
Tams' Interstate Compact Clause argument (Appeal Brief, pp. 7-10; Appellant's 
Rebuttal Brief pp. 4-6) is without merit. There was no showing before either magistrate as 
to whether the state statute (Idaho Code 3 18-3906) conflicts with national policy. R.E. 
Spriggs Co. v Adolph Coom Co., 37 Cal.App.3d 653, 658, 112 Cal Rptr 585 (Cal App.2 
Dist. 1974). As pointed out by the State, ''The Constitution was not intended to prevent the 
states from all regulations relating to the health, safety and life of their citizens, even 
I though that legislation may indirectly burden interstate commerce. Respondent's Appeal 
Brief, p. 17, citing Geneml Motors Corp v. Tracy, 519 U S 278, 307, 117 S Ct. 81 1,828, 
136 L.Ed.,2d 761 (1997). There was no showing of what national policy was involved 
iV. CONCLUSlON AND ORDER. 
IT IS HERBY ORDERED THAT Judge Julian's decision regarding interpretation of 
ldaho Code 5 78-3906 (September 11, 2007, Transcript, p. 19, L 1 - p.. 20, L I )  on Tams' 
I I 
motion to dismiss is reversed Judge Julian is affirmed in all other aspects of his decision 
on Tams' motion to dismiss. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Judge Hardin's decision following the conclusion 
of the trial, regarding interpretation of Idaho Code 5 18-3906 (October 17, 2007, Trial 
Transcript, p. 96, L. 6) is reversed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Judge Hardin's decision following the conclusion 
I 
I 
of the trial, regarding the evidence supporting a finding that Tams acted willfully or 
negligently, is reversed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Tams' conviction is set aside, his appeal bond is 
to be refunded, and this matter dismissed. 
DATED this ~ 7 ' ~  day of April, 2009 
1 hemby certify that on the a 7 day of April, 2009 copies of the foregoing Order were mailed, 
postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or intsrofflce mail to: 
Defense Attorney - DmieI P, Feathemton dD802b~ *%orable Quentin Hardin 
PrbseMlfing Attorney - Jdnn R. Douglas $05 3 6 7 - w n o r a b f e  Jutim Julian CLERK OFTIIE DlSTRlCT COURT 
